Цветные телевизоры в СССР

Color Televisions

Many proponents of the market explanation of
Japan’s economic development point to consumer
electronics as an industry that succeeded without
government promotion. In fact, they argue that the
industry boomed in spite of a blunder by MITI: that
of delaying Sony’s acquisition of transistor technol-
ogy by restricting Sony’s use of foreign exchange.

In 1953, MITI refused Sony permission to acquire
transistor technology from the United States because
MITI did not want to use scarce foreign exchange for
the technology; it also felt that a small, recent
start-up such as Sony would not be able to use a
brand new technology successfully. While the
frequently cited American account of this refusa1
says that MITI delayed Sony’s access for 3 years,
Akio Morita of Sony says it took 6 months to
persuade MITI to give them the needed foreign
exchange. Nonetheless, this mistake stands out as
one of MITI’s more serious errors.
The argument that the industry succeeded without
government help is less powerful when the evidence
is analyzed. The producers of televisions did not
enjoy the number of tailor-made policies and degree
of support given to targeted industries like automo-
biles, steel, semiconductors, and computers. But the
television industry, like many others in Japan,
benefited from government policies that lowered
capital costs, protected against imports and foreign
investment, promoted exports, and tolerated behav-
ior that, in the United States, would have run afoul
of antitrust laws.

MITI’s policies made it possible
for the color television industry to keep prices high
at home and low abroad — in fact, Japanese produc-
ers were found guilty of dumping in the U.S. and
European markets. For over a decade, Japanese
makers sold televisions in the United States for
about one-third to one-half the price of the same sets
in Japan; this export price was also below cost.

High prices at home could only work under certain
conditions: that is, if all major manufacturers agreed
not to undercut one another’s prices (collusive
behavior, by U.S. standards), and if the market were
effectively closed to imports. Both occurred. To fix
export and domestic prices, the managers of the
major manufacturers met regularly in groups such as
the Okura Group and the Palace Group, named after
the hotels in which the meetings took place. And
in the first half of the 1960s, the tariff on television
imports was 40 percent.

While Japanese firms needed to charge low prices
to win U.S. market share, they avoided undue price
competition with each other. Domestic firms set
minimum export prices, which MITI monitored.
Another safeguard was the so-called “five company
rule,’ which required that each Japanese exporter
specify five U.S. dealers as its only and exclusive
customers. This kept large U.S. retailers such as
Sears from playing the Japanese suppliers against
each other to lower prices. An export association
managed the formal registration of these buyer-
supplier relationships; firms reported to that associa-
tion each specific shipment of color televisions to
the United States, stating the buyers and suppliers
involved, and the type, quantity, and price of the
televisions.

When the United States started to complain about
this dumping in the late 1960s, Japanese consumers
became aware of the discrepancy and boycotted
Japanese televisions. MITI immediately gave guid-
ance to the industry to reduce domestic prices, and
the firm complied, though export prices were still
much lower. The secret meetings among the firms
and control of distributors were allowed to continue.
Japanese firms raised prices in the United States
in 1974 in response to growing allegations of
dumping and antitrust violations. This price change
reduced but did not eliminate the gap between high
domestic and lower export prices. Moreover, Japa-
nese television manufacturers reportedly began to
give kickbacks to U.S. retailers, making the actual
prices much lower than those reported in accounting
records, customs forms, and invoices.

Collusion and dumping were not the only reasons
for the success of the Japanese television makers.
Japanese manufacturers worked hard to reduce their
costs by introducing new technologies; in particular,
they converted their TV production to solid-state
integrated circuits early on. Japanese televisions
gained a reputation for reliability in America, and
made it possible for televisions to be repaired by
large retail establishments rather than repair shops.
As in every other successful Japanese industry,
success came from a combination of intelligent
company strategy and diligence, good workers, and
government policies. None of these factors alone
would have resulted in the same record of success.

 

Сколько стоил телевизор в СССР: цены на разные модели

Первые телевизоры в СССР выпускались лимитированными партиями, поэтому доступны были только единицам. Когда же черно-белые модели поступили массово в продажу, цена превышала среднюю зарплату. За 200–450 руб. в шестидесятых можно было купить «Рекорды». На покупку цветных телевизоров не хватало и 2 зарплат, которые составляли 160–200 руб. Чтобы взять технику за 700–1 000 руб., приходилось копить или брать кредит. Но в то же время в каждой второй семье к концу семидесятых был телевизор. //  yakapitalist.ru

 

Первый цветной телевизор
В 1967 г. потребителям был представлен цветной образец – «Рубин-401». Этот отечественный аппарат стал очень дорогим для простого потребителя. 1 000 руб. мог «выложить» не каждый желающий приобрести технику. В наше время эта сумма равна 683 365 руб.

Со временем «рубиновские» модели стали стоить на 100 руб. дешевле. Однако позже эти цветные телевизоры подвинула другая марка – «Горизонт». Его 701-я модель стоила чуть дешевле – в районе 700 руб. – это «Горизонт Ц-355» (406 582 руб. сегодня). Интересно, что у этого телевизора могли быть использованы японские и европейские комплектующие.