Битва у атолла Мидуэй

2.The squadron had been divided into two (2) separate attack units constituted as follows: eighteen (18) SBD-2 airplanes commanded by Major Henderson, and twelve (12) SB2U-3 airplanes commanded by Major Norris. Ten (10) of the pilots manning these twenty-eight (28) planes had joined the squadron only one week prior to the initial engagement. This fact and a shortage of gasoline permitted a maximum of but two (2) hours of training for Major Norris's group and one hour for Major Henderson's group.

 

russo> Пяять? У вас нет копии сообщения и времени отправки? Чтобы мне удостоверится. Не верю просто, с какого фига пять-то?

Normal range 2000 miles with 4000 pounds of bombs = 3218 км / (1814 кг бомб)
Maximum range 3300 miles = 5310 км
Боевой радиус эскадрильи (6-9 машин) с полной нагрузкой = 0.35 ДПол = 0.35 х 1738 = 608 миль.
Боевой радиус эскадрильи без нагрузки = 0.35 ДПол = 0.35 х 2868 = 1004 мили.

 

Из 16 В-25В, участвовавших в налете, один самолет, пилотированный капитаном Йорком, совершил посадку на аэродроме Приморский в районе Владивостока. Экипаж был интернирован. Остальные 15 машин не смогли дотянуть до китайских аэродромов из-за нехватки топлива. Четыре бомбардировщика разбились при попытке совершить вынужденную посадку, экипажи одиннадцати других машин, покинули самолеты в воздухе. Восьмерых летчиков японцам удалось захватить в плен. Трое из них были казнены 15 октября 1942 года: Дин Э. Холлмарк, Уильям Г. Фарроу и Гарольд А. Спад. Роберт Дж. Мелдер умер в плену 1 декабря 1943 года. Потери японцев были не слишком большие, но политический вес налета трудно переоценить.

 

"The basic operation order by the officer conducting the defense of Midway divided the squadron into three (3) units: Major Henderson with nine (9) SBD-2 planes; Captain Tyler with nine (9) SBD-2 planes; and Major Norris with twelve (12) SB2U-3 planes. It was planned to coordinate all these units as closely as possible and particularly Major Henderson's and Captain Tyler's units since they were of the same type.

7.The squadron assumed the normal, immediate alert, status at 0350 on June 4, 1942. Instructions were received to start engines at 0605, take off commenced at 0610, and all planes were air borne at 0620. This apparent delay was caused by some engines which were slow to start and the general scramble of a great number of planes to clear the field. Two (2) SBD-2s failed to get off due to engine trouble and one SB2U-3 returned to the field because a cowling on the left side of his plane blew off. He was unable to get off again because of the arrival of the enemy attacking planes."

 

The Fighting Squadron, under the command of Major Floyd B. Parks, U.S. Marine Corps, was equipped with 21 F2A-3 and 7 F4F-3 airplanes. The Scout-Bombing Squadron under the com­mand of Major Lofton R. Henderson, U.S. Marine Corps, was equipped with 18 SBD-2 and 16 SB2U-3 airplanes. There being only twenty-nine (29) pilots in the latter squadron, one pilot from VMF-221 was assigned to fly with VMSB-241 and 18 SBD-2 and 12 SB2U-3 air­planes were scheduled for employment in battle.

 

gorizont>> Только для этого нужно иметь авианосцы. Впрочем, у американцев они были

SB2U-3 returned to the field because a cowling on the left side of his plane blew off. He was unable to get off again because of the arrival of the enemy attacking planes.

 

a) Sixteen (16) SBD-2 airplanes and eleven (11) SB2U-3 airplanes participated in the bombing attack on the Japanese fleet on June 4, 1942.
(1) Lost in action
SBD-2 Bureau Numbers.
2103 2139 2119 2122
2129 2169 2148 2184
SB2U-3 Bureau Numbers.
2067 2045 2083 2066
(2) Severely damaged beyond repair, having numerous bullet and shrapnel holes, torn fabric, and overspeeded engines - out of commission.
SBD-2 Bureau Numbers.
2111 2106 2142 2144
3B2U-3 Bureau Numbers.
2048 2057 2058
(3) Slightly damaged or undamaged and in commission.
SBD-2 Bureau Numbers.
2178 2124 2162
SB2U-3 Bureau Number.
2053

 

On the evening of June 4, 1942, six (6) SBD-2 airplanes and five (5) CB2U-3 airplanes participated in a search mission. One SB2U-3, Bureau Number 2071 was lost on this mission.
© On the morning of June 5, 1942, six (6) SBD-2 airplanes and six (6) SB2U-3 airplanes participated in an attack on a Japanese battleship.
(1) Slightly damaged by shrapnel but in commission.
SBD-2 Bureau Number 2107.
(2) Lost in action.
SB2U-3 Bureau Number 2053.
(3) Severely damaged with torn fabric and over-speeded engines.
SB2U-3 Bureau Numbers 2064, 2062.

 

russo> Интересуюсь. И, замечу, фигни вроде "американцы потеряли всего 38 самолетов из группы" и особенно "порядка 90 самолетов в строю" я не писал, ага

0615 All aircraft in the air with the exception of 1 PBY5A, 1 SBD-2, 1 F4F-3, 2 F2A-3, 2 3B2U-3, all out of commission, and 3 SB2U-3 spares.

 

russo> Топ-мачтовое? С Б-17 Я тоже такую траву хочу.

General Kenney expanded the possibility of using even the
heavy bombers in low-level roles on his way to Australia in
July 1942. This idea preceded publication of the report of lowlevel
tests then under way in Florida. Kenney “fired” Maj
William Benn, his aide, with whom he had discussed the possibilities
of low-level tactics on the trip to Australia. Benn was
given command of the 63d BS, the first unit in the theater to
adopt these low-level tactics.
Benn’s crews developed two such tactics... :
low-altitude bombing and skip bombing. “Every time we had a
few moments while we were in Port Moresby, we would load
our aircraft with ten 100-pound bombs, using a 4- to 5-second
delay, and drop them by the skip bombing method on the reef
off Port Moresby. The reef had a hull of a sunken ship.”19 At this
point, the distinction between low-altitude and skip bombing
is important. Low-altitude bombing (fig. 3) involved a bomb
run at 2,000 feet or less and at about 200 nautical mph, dropping
two to four bombs over the ship. Low-altitude attacks afforded
better accuracy with smaller formations—typically just
two bombers.
As initially developed in the Southwest Pacific, skip bombing
(fig. 4) called for B-17s to approach the target at between 200
and 250 feet and about 200 knots. The aircraft released bombs
with delay fuses of four to five seconds so that they would hit 60
to 100 feet short of the ship. A perfect skip would take them the
remaining distance and either send the bombs into the side of
the ship or up against it, sinking and detonating underwater.
Both outcomes proved effective, and the percentage of hits
turned out substantially better than those from high-altitude
attacks.20 Hull penetration was only a secondary outcome.
By 2 October 1942... the 43d BG took off for Rabaul.
Jim Murphy and his crew were among the first trained in lowaltitude
B-17 work. That night they broke out [of the weather] at 2,500 feet.
Dawn was just breaking and
[they were] flying east right into the sun. . . .
[The] bombardier and navigator
both saw the huge transport about forty degrees off to our left, I
[Murphy] dropped down and angled into the biggest ship I had ever
seen. I told Lombard [the bombardier] to drop the four 1,000-pound
bombs simultaneously when we reached the target. . . . [We] had a
good 20-second run, straight and level. The bombs went exactly as we
hoped—one hit the ship directly, with the other three very close to it.
Major fires broke out all over the ship. The results were fantastic. I
[Murphy] had hit a 15,000-ton transport. McCullar hit a cargo ship,
7,000 tons, setting it on fire; Sogaard hit a destroyer. . . . At 2,000 feet,
we just couldn’t miss!

 

From the beginning, it
was obvious that the Fw 200 could not attack in the way a normal bomber did, but had
to rely on low-level attack (Tiefangriff) tactics. Approaching as low as 45m off the water
at 290km/h (180mph), a Condor would release one or two bombs at a distance of
about 240m (790ft) from the target. This method ensured a high probability that the
bomb would either strike the ship directly or detonate in the water alongside, causing
damage. Although the early Condors only carried a load of four 250kg bombs, the
low-level method made it highly likely that at least one ship would be sunk or damaged
on each sortie that found a target. Since most civilian freighters were unarmored and
lacked robust damage control, even moderate damage inflicted would often prove fatal.
KG 40 became so adept at low-level tactics in early 1941 that some attacks scored three
out of four hits. However, many of the bombs that struck the target failed to explode
due to improper fusing – a nagging problem for the low-level method. Once the
Condors shifted to attacks from 3,000m (9,840ft) with the Lotfe 7D bombsight, which
had a circular error probability of 91m (300ft) with a single bomb against a stationary
target, about one bomb in three landed close enough to inflict at least some damage.