Реклама Google — средство выживания форумов :)
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— Слава! Репетуй его команды хотя бы по-английски, когда он забывается и орет по-русски! — сказал Советник переводчику.-- Особенно в машину, командиру БЧ-V. Механик хоть что-то по-английски поймет, а по-русски-то полная чепуха получается!
И здесь опрокинулись все его расчеты. Опять посыпались бомбы и взвыли «нурсы».
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... Однако не следует забывать, что может найтись тип, который побывал там, где и ты. Дальнейший спор между вами в широкой прессе о мелких неточностях этнографии хотя и рекламирует обоих, но все-таки действует на нервы. Твердо знай, что на Руси со времен святого Андрея бесконечно переименовывают и по-разному пишут названия не только отечественных и географических пунктов, но и все другие. Назови, например, Сингапур "Си-НГ-Пу-Ром", и тебе сам черт не брат, ибо в Си-НГ-Пу-Ре никто, кроме тебя, не был. ...
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Many authors have attempted to explain why the Eilat was lost. They point to a number of factors. First, the Eilat was an old destroyer (built in 1944) that lacked modern antiaircraft armament. The Israeli navy soon decommissioned its remaining destroyers, the last in 1969. (It is true that in 1968 Israel decommissioned its destroyer Haifa, but it was only in April 1969 that its last destroyer, Jaffa, was sunk by two missiles as a target during testing of the Israeli Gabriel missile.) Also, on the eve of the attack Eilat's normal combat readiness was reduced because of the ship's celebration of the twelfth anniversary of its commissioning into the Israeli navy. Also, whereas a normal crew consisted of 250, the ship carried a complement of 199 as it proceeded on its last patrol (20 percent less than normal). Fourth, the small Egyptian boats shot from a sheltered bay, a fact which, to a large extent, increased their firing efficiency. Further, the Eilat was patrolling in one area at cruising speed, which allowed the Egyptian missile crews to prepare properly for the attack and conduct it in close to firing-range conditions. Finally, the attack was a complete surprise to the Israelis, because they failed to identify the boats as carrying missiles. Thus an unsuspecting Eilat proved crucial for a successful attack.
We may also add the fact that Eilat was sufficiently large to be an excellent target for the Soviet Styx missile, designed for such targets. Also, the ship took neither active nor passive countermeasures against these missiles, which were vulnerable to either. It was on patrol without an escort, which made it impossible to apply the well mastered methods of counter-ambush to obstruct the Egyptian picket patrol (as in the case on 12 June 1967), allowing the Egyptians to attack undisturbed. On the other hand, the innovative aspect of the 21 October ambush was that it achieved tactical surprise by deploying a brand new weapon, which allowed Egyptian missile boats, masked as torpedo boats, to feel secure enough to fire at ease.